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11 Introduction
The analysis of EU Regional Policy is a delicate issue. Especially the EU structural funds (SF)
as a major regional policy instrument have been subject to an extensive debate in academic and
political spheres. With a volume of e213 billion in the funding period from 2000 to 2006 and
a designated sum of e347 billion in the actual funding period up to 2013 it displays the second
highest amount in the EU budget (Inforegio 2008). The goal of SF is to support handicapped
regions by the provision of physical investment grants to the private business sector, human
capital qualication schemes and local public infrastructure among others. Funding is split into
three major objectives and a broader class of minor objectives. In this paper, we concentrate
on the causal impact of objective 1 payments (or in new terminology objective \convergence"),
which explicitly targets intra-EU income convergence by stimulation the growth performance
in lagging regions.
Despite its political importance, only few studies thoroughly account for the dicult task
of identifying the causal eects of funding by an appropriate identication strategy within a
rigorous evaluation approach. In a recent literature survey, Dall'erba et al. (2007) show that
only a dozen out of more than one hundred studies dealing with European regional policies,
conduct a formal econometric estimation of the impact of structural funds on growth. For
Gripaios et al. (2008) the reason for this is threefold: In rst place, it is hard to establish
a reasonable counterfactual situation from which the policy impact can be assessed. The
identication of the causal eect of funding is furthermore hindered by the likely occurrence
of overlapping (supranational, national and regional) policies as well as, nally, the poor data
quality for EU-wide analyses.
Nevertheless, those empirical studies conducted so far, increasingly show a high degree of in-
novativeness and professionalism in dealing with the likely pitfalls of analysing regional growth
and convergence processes in the EU linked to the notion of funding. Two streams have basi-
cally evolved. Being aware of the problems associated with the descriptive approach typically
employed in regional economics, these new attempts rely heavily on structural or experimen-
talist research designs in order to address the problems raised by Gripaios et al. (2008) and to
identify the quantitative impacts of policy changes (Holmes 2010). While the latter school has
been mainly promoted through microeconometric based evaluation studies in the eld of labor
economics, the structural approach has been elaborated mainly in modern macroeconomic anal-
ysis and aims at estimating empirical models closely tied to a theoretical benchmark in order to
interpret the value of the empirical parameters or set theory-guided identication restrictions
(see Rickman 2010 for an overview).
Regarding its empirical application for EU regional policy analysis, Mohl and Hagen (2008)
as well as Becker et al. (2010a) use a generalized propensity score model to estimate the
impact of structural funds on GDP growth. In similar veins, Becker et al. (2010b) apply a
2regression discontinuity approach to the same empirical question. Although on the one hand
these experimentalist models are very didactic in terms of stressing the severe consequences
of biases stemming from self-selection into treatment and right-hand-side endogeneity of the
policy variable and typically involve less assumptions about the parametric form of the model,
on the other hand, given their translation from (microeconometric) labour market research they
also face some shortcomings: For example, the generalized propensity score approach in Becker
et al. (2010a) can only discriminate among the eectiveness of structural fund payments for the
subset of beneciary regions. No comparison can be made regarding the growth performance
of non-funded regions.
Moreover, given the long history of national and supranational regional policy schemes, it is
disputable whether these methods are eective in balancing pre-treatment dierences among
the analysed regions as necessary condition for the isolation of the causal eect of funding.
Typically, the pre-treatment period is chosen on the basis of ad-hoc considerations or simply
taken as rst year of observations available, irrespective of whether the policy programme is
already operating at this point of time or not. Of course, for a system of interrelated regions
not only in space, but also in the space-time dimension these shortcomings do not come as a
surprise. Given the institutional design of the EU regional policy which makes funding itself
a function of economic characteristics such as regional GDP, (although desirable) it is rather
impossible to nd non-funded regions as comparison group for the funded counterparts, which
face the same characteristics except their treatment status.1
As an alternative point of departure, theoretical models and their conforming empirical
operationalizations may help to form concrete testable expectations about the likely impact and
transmission mechanisms from the policy stimulus to changes in the outcome variable (see, e.g.,
de la Fuente 2000 for an survey). Together with recently established methodological advances
in the eld of panel and spatial econometrics, this may be seen as a promising road ahead and,
in fact, is the mainstream approach taken by scholars for EU regional policy assessment. Arbia
et al. (2008), for instance, carefully discuss the topic of the estimators' choice on the model
predictions in a neoclassical convergence equation setting. The authors nd that the revealed
convergence parameter remains rather stable over a range of dierent estimators; however,
careful interpretation of obtained parameter has to be done since dierent specications may
imply quite dierent concepts of convergence. Careful specication and interpretation has also
be taken seriously if a policy variable is added to the regression exercise and/or an explicit
notion is given to the role of space. Regarding the latter, Mohl and Hagen (2010) show by
means of various panel data approaches that it is necessary to control for spatial spillover eects,
which conrms earlier results that regional growth signicantly depends on the performance of
1Similar arguments holds for the violation of the stable-unit-treatment assumption in a system of interrelated regions, where
funding is expected not only to aect the own region's economic performance but spills over to neighboring regions.
3neighboring regions.
For theoretical underpinnings, most of the empirical approaches rely on the Solow-type
neoclassical growth model framework and test for the so called {convergence implying that
poor regions grow faster than their richer counterparts. Convergence among European regions
is in fact a necessary condition for EU regional policy { and in particular Objective 1 structural
funds { to work. However, rather than testing the empirical implications of the theoretical
model in most studies variable selection turns out to be rather eclectic borrowing from dierent
theoretical concepts and the specication of the empirical model is thus rather ad hoc. This
is especially true when it comes to the inclusion of policy variables. In the following, we thus
aim at estimating dierent growth models guided by neoclassical growth theory that carefully
accounts for theoretical predictions regarding the expected transmission channels from policy
input to economic outcome eects.
Among the crucial aspects dealt with is the question whether it is reasonable to assume
that the EU structural funds have an eect on the region's steady-state growth rate or are
rather expected to solely alter the speed of adjustment towards their equilibrium value. As
will be shown, accounting for either of these transmission channels implies dierent empirical
operationalizations of the neoclassical growth model. The same holds for the inclusion of spatial
spillover variables. Using a broad set of dierent empirical specications allows us to give a
more robust answer whether Objective 1 structural fund payments have let to a higher growth
performance of funded regions throughout the period 1997{2007. Our results are however
disillusioning: We either nd insignicant or even negative policy eects, which raise doubts
regarding the eectiveness of EU regional policy. The latter results are particularly driven
by negative spatial spillovers. That is, regions with a high share of grant recipients in their
neighborhood show to have a signicant worse growth performance compared to regions with
a technologically advanced neighborhood. Besides conrming the theoretical predictions of
spatialized Solow growth models, these ndings hint at the existence of dierence geographical
convergence clubs for the EU as already identied by earlier scholars (see, e.g., Ramajo et al.
2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briey presents the
underlying theoretical model and proposes dierent scenarios in order to estimate the likely
eect of the structural funds on output growth. Section 3 then presents the database, while
section 4 reports the empirical results for the aspatial and spatial models, as well ndings of
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper.
42 Convergence, transitory dynamics and spatial linkages
2.1 Growth model specications
In this section, we rst outline the neoclassical Solow-Swan-type growth framework that serves
a vehicle for our empirical identication approach. The model is then augmented to account
for spatial spillovers in order to capture the mutual interdependence among European regions.





= a + b  ln(yi;0) + i;T; (1)
where gi;t is the growth rate of GDP per capita (y) in region i over the period [0;T]. The
cross-sectional dimension is i = 1;:::;N. The coecients a and b = (1   e t)=T have to be
estimated. The implicit parameter  is the average regional rate of convergence towards steady
state income, i;T is the error term, which is assumed to be homoskedastic, non-correlated and
normally distributed. In analyzing income convergence, special attention is devoted to the
interpretation of the coecient b. The main motivation for using the concept of neoclassical
growth and convergence as formal model framework is that it allows us to control for dierent
initial income levels which serve as proxies for the region's initial capital endowment. Given
decreasing marginal returns to capital, initial income levels are then expected to be negatively
correlated with the growth rate of the regional economy. That is, if b < 0, convergence forces
are at work. However, b < 0 is not a sucient condition for unconditional convergence to occur.
Besides, the convergence rate  should be in accordance with its theoretically expected value,
where  can be derived as  = (1   )(g + n + ), and  is the output elasticity of capital, g
is technological progress, n is population growth and  is the capital depreciation rate (Tondl
2001).
In this setup, the fundamental ingredient of convergence analysis is the idea of the existence
of a transitory income path common to all regions, which exhibits declining growth rates towards
the path to the steady-state income. Or, in other words, initially poor regions are expected
to grow faster the more remote they are with respect to steady-state income. Besides the
assumption of diminishing marginal products in capital and labor, the model also assumes that
the level of technology is exogenous as well as that returns to scale for capital and labor are
constant in the production function (see, e.g., Tondl 2001 for details). Assumptions i.) to iii.)
together imply that regions will converge to a common steady-state income level, meaning that
convergence is unconditional. The only reason why regions show dierences in their per capita
income growth rate is the initially heterogeneous endowment with capital. In the long run,
with constant population only a rise in the exogenously determined technology level leads to
changes in the steady-state income.
5Relaxing the strong assumption of homogeneity in the long-run technology level leads to a
dierent model prediction also known as conditional convergence. Here regions face identical
growth rates in steady-state. Nevertheless, their income levels may dier due to dierences in
the technology level, where the latter are typically treated as `catch all' parameter for dierent
kinds of potential driving factors of regional long-run development such as the regional knowl-
edge stock, human capital, and public infrastructure. Neglecting these potential steady state
determinants clearly leads to an omitted variable bias (Islam, 1995). Ways to get around with
these problems typically involve two modications of the approach in eq.(1): First, in order
to account for time-constant steady state eects, panel data specications of the convergence
equation have been estimated which allow for the inclusion of time-xed region specic dummy
variables. Second, to control for time-varying determinants, variables derived from new growth
theory models have been included. The latter models mainly motivate the role played by hu-
man capital, public infrastructure and R&D investments among other factors in driving the
regions long-run steady state income level.
In its panel data specication eq.(1) can be written as
gi;t = ln(yi;t)   ln(yi;t 1) = ai   b  ln(yi;t 1) + 
0X + Ft + ui;t; t=(1,...,T); (2)
where ai is a set of region specic dummies, X is a vector of further time-varying control
variables such as the regional knowledge stock, human capital, and public infrastructure, Ft is
a set of time dummies to control for common time-specic eects and ui;t is the model's error
terms. The dierence to the cross-sectional specication in eq.(1) is that panel data estimation
uses several observation in time and thus parameter estimates such as b = (1 e ) are derived
from a much richer set of information than cross-sectional analyses.
Using eq.(2) as basic setup, we will now develop four extensions in order to conduct the policy
evaluation and to quantify the impact of objective 1 structural funds payments on regional GDP
per capita growth. These are summarized in Table 1.











2.2 Case I: Aspatial linear additive model
Most of the empirical work augments the neoclassical growth equation by policy variables in
a simple linear additive fashion by simply adding a variable measuring the structural funds
input SFi;t to the vector of control variables X. We will refer to this as case I in the following.
6To measure the policy impact from objective 1 structural funds in this setup, two alternative
variable specication are typically employed. Regions eligible for receiving objective 1 subsidies
can either be identied by a binary dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the region has
received subsidies for the period of analysis and zero otherwise. Alternatively, total objective
1 spendings normalized by size or a regional performance indicator (such as population for
the former, total employment or regional GDP for the latter) can be used, which result in a
measure for the funding intensity of the policy scheme.2 Mohl and Hagen (2010), for instance,
propose the following augmented model specication




j  ln(SFi;t j) + Ft + ui;t; (3)
where
PN
j=1 ln(SFi;t j) is the sum of lagged structural funds payments per total population
over lags 1 to M. The advantage of this distributed lag specication over the inclusion of
contemporaneous or simply one period lagged structural funds payments is that the notion
of time lags in the transmission channel from the policy input to the outcome variable of
interest can be better addressed. One example is public infrastructure, which are expected
to fade in only after a certain time period of installation (see, e.g., Bradley et al. 2006).
Although the approach in eq.(3) thus already accounts for the importance of time-consuming
adjustment processes in the analysis of the structural funds impact, the chosen specication
nevertheless rests on the strong assumption that the SF payments actually inuence long-
run steady state income dierences among funded and non-funded regions rather than their
temporary dynamics towards steady-state. While this argument may partially hold for provision
of public infrastructure or human capital investments, in the light of the growth theoretical
underpinnings it is a rather unreasonable assumption for the case of private investment aid,
which still account for a large fraction of overall objective 1 structural funds payments.3
2.3 Case II: Aspatial multiplicative interaction model
For investment subsidies the neoclassical growth model basically predicts that a permanent in-
crease in the economy's investment rate leads to a temporary increase in the economic growth
rates with a permanent shift of the economy's steady-state income level. Focusing on a graphi-
cal presentation of the model's dynamic properties (for technical details see Tondl 2001, Favero
2001), Figure 1 shows a region's long-run (or steady-state) growth path AA as a function of
exogenously determined technical progress. In time period t0, the investment rate is perma-
2As De Castris and Pellegrini (2010) point out, the use a simple ag to single out regions with or without policy funding may
not be adequate if there is a high variability across regions in terms of the amount if subsidies.
3For the funding period 2000{2006, ERDF objective 1 commitments to the private sector (Category 1 Productive Environment)
account up to 91% of all ERDF objective 1 commitments in Austria, 85% in Belgium, 79 in Sweden, 75% in Finland and about
50% in the UK, Netherlands and Germany. The total ERDF volume for this period was 101 billion. For further details see Sweco
(2008).
7nently increased (e.g., via an investment subsidy scheme). As the gure shows, this leads to a
temporary increase in the economy's growth rate between time period t0 and t1. However, the
more the economy converges towards its new path BB in t1, this eect fades out. Nevertheless,
there is a permanent level eect resulting in a higher steady-state growth path BB with a
higher output (productivity) level as a result of increased investment activity. For economic
policy, it is important that this level eect is only permanent if the increase in the investment
rate is long lasting. Otherwise, the economy would return to the long run path AA.







Translating the theoretical model predictions into an empirically testable form is done by case
II of our impact analysis. Here, objective 1 structural funds payments are only expected to inu-
ence the speed of convergence of the regional economy towards its steady-state. We operational-
ize this transmission channel by including an interaction term dened as the policy variable
times initial (or in the case of panel data: lagged) income according to (ln(SFi;t 1)  ln(yi;t 1)).
As Brambor et al. (2005) point out, in order to adequately measure the marginal eect of fund-
ing conditional on these two exogenous variables, ln(SFi;t 1) and ln(yi;t 1) have to be included
as constitutional terms in the regression framework as:4
gi;t = ai   b  ln(yi;t 1) + 
0X + 1  ln(SFi;t 1) (4)
4For ease of presentation we only present the one period lagged multiplicative interaction term here. However, in the empirical
analysis we will also account for higher order lags.
8+  (ln(SFi;t 1)  ln(yi;t 1)) + Ft + ui;t;
The use of the interaction term in the convergence equation can be motivated as follows:
As shown above, the convergence rate  is determined by the output elasticity of capital, as
well as population growth and capital depreciation rate, respectively. This xed relationship,
however, only holds for a closed economy. For regional analysis, the latter assumption does not
seem plausible since we can expect a high mobility of capital among interrelated regional units.
The introduction of (incomplete) capital mobility in the neoclassical growth model framework
can then be done conditional on the initial income level, so that the value of the convergence
rate  additionally captures the eect of capital mobility. To be more precise, the convergence
rate  can now be formulated as  = (1   )(g + n +  + !), where the additional term !
reects the elasticity of external capital supply.
Thus, as long as ! is non-zero, taking capital mobility into account, it obviously increases
. As Schalk & Untiedt (1996) point out, the basic assumption for this transmission channel
to work is that the external capital inux is determined by regional dierences in the marginal
return of capital. Yet, it is precisely the goal of investment subsidies to reduce the user cost
of capital and thus to aect regional dierences in the marginal return of capital in favor of
supported regions (Alecke et al. 2011). Not accounting for this policy-induced change in the
regional rate of return to physical investment in poor regions would result in a biased estimation
of . A negative regression coecient for the interaction term  implies that the speed of
convergence for supported regions is enhanced. However, one has to be aware that in the case
of multiplicative interaction models statistical signicance cannot be inferred directly from the
regression output.5 The total convergence rate can then be measured as (b + ) = (1   e ).
The theoretically expected relationship between initial income and the SF policy eect is
shown graphically in gure 2. A negative coecient  for the interaction term implies that, for
each initial income level below the steady-state (y), funded regions show a higher speed of con-
vergence in the growth/initial income-diagram relative to non-funded regions. The intersection
of convergence curves for funded and non-funded regions marks the steady-state income level,
where regions uniformly grow by (g+n+), driven by the constant rate of growth of technology
(g), population growth (n), and the capital depreciation rate (). In fact, eq.(4) represents a
special case of a more general empirical setup, which relaxes the assumption of homogeneous
regression parameters between funded and non-funded regions in eq.(4). This would lead to a
fully interacted switching-regime model specication and would imply testing for signicantly
dierent long-run convergence clubs for the set of funded and non-funded regions (see Durlauf
and Johnson 1995, Durlauf et al., 2001).
5Instead, one has to compute the standard error as  =
p
var(b) + var() + 2  cov(b) (see Brambor et al. 2005).
9Figure 2: Regional policy induced change in slope coecient of convergence equation
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2.4 Case III: Spatial linear additive model
So far, we have treated the region's growth rate as being independent from its environment.
This may be an over simplistic regression design. Recent contributions in the eld of regional
science have pointed to the empirical relevance of spatial dependencies in the analysis of income
growth and convergence as well as spatial spillovers from regional policy instruments (see, e.g.,
Morena and Trehan, 1997, Fingleton, 2001). This also led to various reformulations of the
neoclassical growth model to properly account for spatial eects. Ertur and Koch (2007) as
well as Fischer (2010), for instance, augment the neoclassical framework to capture spatial
spillovers by endogenizing the constant region-specic technology parameter ai from eq.(2) to
account for spatially related technological interdependencies. The model basically assumes that
the region i's technology level is a function of the technology level from regions in the direct
proximity of region i. Alternatively, Egger and Pfaermayr (2006) as well as Pfaermayr (2009)
propose a spatial Solow growth model which assumes spillovers rising from learning eects in
course of capital accumulation in the spirit of Quah (1993).
The proposed production function of the latter type of models implies that the total factor
productivity of a specic region is positively related to the level of development of surrounding
regions as measured by their spatially weighted ratio of capital to eciency units of labor.
Hence, spatial spillovers between any two regions decrease with the distance between them and
{ at a given distance { they are the higher the more advanced the neighboring regions are
10(Pfaermayr, 2009). Building on these theoretical extensions, we can derive a linear empirical
operationalization for the spatial Solow model as




j  ln(SFi;t j) + Ft + ui;t; (5)
where W is a N  N weighting matrix linking lagged income levels yj;t 1 for the sample
observations j 6= i to information about the j's region spatial proximity with respect to region
i. The parameter  measures the strength of spatial spillovers and for  = 0 the derived steady
state is identical to that one derived for the traditional Solow model. Pfaermayr (2009)
additionally shows that for the spatial Solow model the speed of convergence varies across
regions and depends not only on  but also the strength of spillovers. The author shows that
the lower the absolute value of the gap in initial income of a region's neighbors, the more the
region can learn and the higher are spatial spillovers. Ignoring interregional spillovers may lead
to an estimation bias if all regions approach to their steady state income levels from below.
Recent contributions have shown that a similar bias may not only occur for the estimation of
 but also the impact of the policy stimulus. Eckey & Koesfeld (2005) and Alecke et al. (2011),
for instance, have shown that disregarding the likely spatial eects associated with German
regional private investment subsidies may lead to a substantial bias in the overall empirical
assessment of the policy eect. To measure the latter eect properly, the authors propose a
spatially augmented regression approach that does also incorporate further spatial lags of the
set of right-hand-side regressors. The main message from the authors' analysis is that, although
nding a positive direct eect for supported regions, negative indirect eects partly or entirely
oset the positive eect. Similarly, spatial crowding out eects of private sector investment
grants are also reported in De Castris and Pellegrini (2010) for Italian regions. Taking into
account these ndings, we may further augment the model to








1;j  ln(SFi;t j) +
N X
j=1
2;j  (W  ln(SFi;t j)) + Ft + ui;t;
Note that here the policy variable is present twice, rst by its level values and also by its
spatial lagged values with coecients 1 and 2, respectively. The specication in eq.(6) serves
as case III of our impact evaluation exercise for objective 1 structural funds payments. As De
Castris and Pellegrini (2010) point out, one restricting element of the above model framework
is that the empirical measurement of the spatial eect is aected by a spatial identication
problem: That is, the spillover eect generated by the policy incentives should be disentangled
from the spatial attraction across neighboring areas that cannot be attributed to incentives. By
11means of factor restrictions the authors then test whether the spatial spillover eect measured
by 2;j is equal to the spatial spillover eects induced by the covariates. If this equality holds,
the policy spillover eects have to be attributed entirely to the general pattern of spatial
autocorrelation across areas and not to specic policy eects.
2.5 Case IV: Spatial multiplicative interaction model
Although this regression approach has a very rich set of explanatory regressors, again one
may argue that the empirical specication of the growth equation according to eq.(6) lacks
to account of the dynamic eect of interregional spillovers along the convergence path towards
steady state. Upon our knowledge, only very few empirical studies try to do so. One exception is
Ramajo et al. (2008), who use a spatially augmented multiplicative interaction model to analyse
convergence among EU regions during the period 1981 to 1996. However, the authors do not
have information with respect to the size of the policy stimulus and simply distinguish funded
and non-funded regions by means of their membership in one of the four Cohesion countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). This identication strategy may be problematic since
many of factors (social, economic, institutional etc.) rather than EU policy may be inuential
in driving growth rate dierences between the Cohesion-country group and the rest of the
European regions. Also, the latter regions have also received structural funds payments over
the observation period, which makes causal identication even harder. By using actual amounts
of structural funds payments in a spatially augmented multiplicative interaction model, we try
to circumvent this identication problem.
In order to incorporate the spatial eect on the region's speed of convergence, we do so by
conditioning the policy eect on a second modifying variable in the regression design. Here we
use the amount of objective 1 payments to neighboring regions. Taking up the argumentation
from Pfaermayr (2009) we expect that with an increasing amount of funds allocated to neigh-
boring regions the growth performance of region i ceteris paribus decreases since the learning
eects from having more technology-advanced regions around diminish. Also, this variable may
capture the spatial crowding out eects observed from regional policy grant schemes in Eckey
and Kosfeld (2005) as well as De Castris and Pellegrini (2010). The full regression equation
then becomes




2(W  X) (7)
+1  ln(SFi;t 1) + 2  (W  ln(SFi;t 1)) + 1  (ln(SFi;t 1)  (W  ln(SFi;t 1)))
+2  (ln(SFi;t 1)  ln(yi;t 1)) + 3  (W  ln(SFi;t 1))  ln(yi;t 1))
+  (ln(SFi;t 1)  (W  ln(SFi;t 1))  ln(yi;t 1)) + Ft + ui;t;
As for the regression approach in eq.(4), in order not to run the risk of obtaining an omitted
12variable bias, all individual and higher order constitutive terms have to be included in the spec-
ication. The main parameter of interest, , thus measures the region's speed of convergence
conditional on the amount of own funding for region i as well as the amount of funds allocated
to the neighborhood of i. However, again we have to be aware that this multiplicative interac-
tion eect model deserves a careful statistical interpretation. Before we turn to the empirical
estimation and interpretation of the outlined cases I to IV, we rst give a brief overview of the
dataset employed and present some stylized facts.
3 Institutional setup, data and stylized facts
The SF are the main instruments of the EU regional policy and are intended to support hand-
icapped regions by the provision of physical investment grants to the private business sector,
human capital qualication schemes as well as local public infrastructure. The funding is split
into three major objectives, among them the objective 1 payments (or in the new terminol-
ogy of EU-funds the objective \convergence"). Objective 1 payments are provided to promote
growth in lagging regions whose GDP per capita is below 75% of the EU average and are
mainly issued through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European
Social Fund (ESF).
For the focus of our study, there are some strong arguments to concentrate on the nar-
row denition of objective 1 payments instead of looking at the eectiveness of all objectives.
First of all, the legislative framework and selection criteria for objective 1 regions have stayed
nearly unchanged for the three analysed funding periods 1994{1999, 2000{2006 and 2007{2013.
This does not hold for the other objectives. Furthermore, objective 1 payments are the most
prominent SF instrument making up two third of the entire SF budget. Moreover, objective 1
payments have a clear measurable policy goal in terms of fostering regional income convergence
and have a clear denition of regional standards for claiming Objective 1 payments. That is,
regions with a GDP per capita (thereafter GDPpc) below 75 percent of the EU average are
eligible for receiving objective 1 payments, irrespective of their current GDP growth or any
form of growth expectations. This should reduce the potential problem of reversed causality
for analyzing the impact of objective 1 payments on income growth.
Data about funding payments are taken from the commission's annual report on the struc-
tural funds for the years 1994 to 1999 (European Commission, 1996 to 2000) and from on-site
access at the DG Budget for the years 2000 to 2007.6 We need to make some assumptions re-
garding actual nancial payments for the period 1994{1999, since there is a dierence between
the sum of commitments and the sum of payments for this period. By the N +2 rule we know
6We concentrate on information about real payments because it seems to be unrealistic that there is an eect merely arising
from the commitment of grants.
13that all commitments from 1999 have to be paid out in 2001 at latest. Therefore, we equally
spread dierences between the sum of commitments and payments for the year 1999 on the
actual spendings for the subsequent years 2000 and 2001. Having no further information on
the actual spending behavior, this seems for us to be the best way for handling this matter.
We estimate our model specications for a set of 127 EU15 regions over the period 1997{2007.
Our outcome variable of interest is the annual growth rate of GDPpc. As mentioned before,
the included set of regressors are mainly considered to control for economic dierences and
therefore allowing individual steady-state levels. We explicitly control for regional dierences
in four key variables: i.) physical capital accumulation, ii.) the share of human capital, iii.)
the region's labor participation and iv.) annual population's growth. Capital accumulation is
measured in terms of the investment intensity as gross xed capital formation in manufacturing
relative to GDP. Since it is rather hard to nd high-quality data for human capital at the EU
regional level, we proxy the latter by the share of human resources in science and technology
in total employment.
We also include the labor participation rate dened as employed persons per total population
among the set of regressors in order to cancel out regional dierences in productivity (GPD
per employed persons) and GDPpc. And nally we control for regional population growth to
wipe out these eects in the variation of our left hand side variable. Especially for regions
with strongly varying population growth rates, this latter eect may complicate the isolation
of the causal eect of objective 1 funding on GDPpc growth. For empirical estimation, we
use all variables in their logarithmic transformations. An overview of variable denitions and
summary statistics is given in Table 2. We use the disaggregated NUTS 2 whenever possible;
however, due to poor data availability especially for the structural funds, in some cases we
have to rely on higher levels of aggregation. Eventually, this leads to a sample of 127 regional
entities. A detailed list of all regions covered is given in the appendix.
4 Econometric Approach and Results
4.1 Dynamic Panel Data Estimation
Choosing the proper estimation technique for our various regression designs is a challenging
issue since we need to account both for time as well as spatial dynamics in a panel data
framework. However, we can strongly benet from recent advantages in estimating dynamic
panel data processes as well as their spatial augmentations. To briey develop the underlying
estimation strategy, we rewrite the standard panel data specication of our neoclassical growth
model in terms of a general dynamic panel data model (in log-linear specication) as





jXi;t j + i + t + i;t; (8)
14Table 2: Variable denitions and descriptive statistics
Variable Denition Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Income (GDPpc) GDP per capita (in
Euro)




relative to GDP (in %)


















population level (in %)





payment per capita (in
Euro)
39.5331 67.1766 0 475.5377
Source: All economic variable are taken from Eurostat (2010) regional database, data on structural Funds payments
are obtained from DG Budget, unit A.2.
where the dependent variable is now specied in level terms as yi;t and the coecient 1 can
be related to our b from above according to 1 = 1   b. In this general setup i present the
unobservable individual eects, t are time-xed eects and i;t is the remainder error term.
In the recent literature there are numerous contributions on how to estimate a dynamic
model of the above type consistently and eciently. One specic problem to deal with is the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the estimation equation and its built-in correlation
with the individual eect: That is, since yit is a function of i, also yi;t 1 is a function of i and
thus yi;t 1 as right-hand side regressor in eq.(8) is likewise correlated with the combined error
term. Even in the absence of serial correlation of it this renders standard -class estimators
such as OLS, the xed eects model (FEM) and random eects model (REM) inconsistent (see
Nickel 1981 or Baltagi 2008 for an overview).
Besides analytical and bootstrap-based approaches aiming to correct for the bias of the FEM
(Kiviet 1995, Everaert and Pozzi 2007), the most widely applied approaches of dealing with
this kind of endogeneity typically applies instrumental variable (IV) and generalized methods of
moments (GMM) based techniques. While the rst generation of models used transformations
in rst dierences, latter extensions also account for the information in levels, when setting
up proper estimators. A common tool is the system GMM estimator (thereafter, SYS-GMM)
by Blundell & Bond (1998) as weighted average of rst dierence and level GMM. The joint
determination of data in rst dierences and levels mainly helps to increase the eciency of
the latter method compared to earlier specications solely relying on rst dierenced data
(Arellano and Bond 1991). In this paper, we mainly focus on the SYS-GMM estimator and use
15non-IV alternatives such as the corrected FEM as further references in order to detect severe
misspecications among the IV based approaches. Regarding the latter, we also carefully
account for the `many' and/or `weak instrument' problem typically associated with GMM
estimation, since the instrument count grows as the sample size T rises.
Given its very exible form, subsequently also extensions of the GMM approach have been
proposed, which make use of consistent moment conditions for the instrumentation of the spatial
lag coecient of the endogenous variable (see Kukenova and Monteiro 2009, Mitze 2010 as well
as Bouayad-Agha and Vedrine 2010). Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) have also shown, by means
of Monte Carlo simulations, that the spatial dynamic SYS-GMM model exhibits satisfactory
nite sample properties. We use various sets of instruments for the spatial extension of the
SYS-GMM approach. Besides, for the case of the multiplicative interaction models in case
II and case IV we also have to be aware the standard statistical inference is not feasible and
regression outputs cannot be interpreted per se. As Brambor et al. (2005) as well as Braumoeller
(2004) point out, besides the inclusion of all constitutional terms to avoid running the risk of
an omitted variable bias, it is essential to calculate substantively meaningful marginal eects
and standard errors. Moreover, the analysis should not interpret constitutive terms as if they
are unconditional marginal eects since this is only true for a very restrictive case (namely
when all further variables used to calculate the interaction term are zero). The calculation of
meaningful standard errors implies that further elements of the variance-covariance matrix of
the estimation system have to be used besides it main diagonal elements (see Brambor et al.
2005 for details). We will account for these aspects in the following.
4.2 Empirical results: Case I and II
We start estimating the linear additive model (case I) as most commonly applied evaluation
approach for regional policy eectiveness of EU structural funds. We estimate dierent model
specications starting from the basic setup outlined in eq.(3). The results for the standard xed
eects model (FEM), a bias corrected version of the latter (FEMc) and SYS-GMM-models are
reported in Table 3. While the set of economic control variables remains unchanged in all
specications, for the policy variable we allow the lag structure to vary between a short-run
single lag specication and a medium-run one to four lag specication. For the latter case, Table
3 reports the joint eect of funding computed based on the delta method. Next to objective
1 funding intensities we also test for the signicance of a binary dummy which takes values
of one if the region was funded in the last period and zero otherwise. All equations include
time common eects and for the case of the SYS-GMM model we also include country level
dummies.7
7Due to the time-invariance the country-specic eects are cancelled out in the FEM and FEMc.
16Columns I to III in Table 3 report the results in the FEM benchmark model. All control-
variables show the theoretically excepted coecient sign and are tested to be statistically sig-
nicant. The only exception is the population growth rate, which turns out to be insignicant.
However, physical investments, human capital and the labor participation rate have a posi-
tive impact on GDPpc evolution. The included lagged GDPpc value has a coecient of less
than 1, which accords to the neoclassical theory and proofs stationarity of the variable. From
the regression output we can also calculate the implicit convergence-speed to the individual
steady state levels. Taking column II as an example, our estimates imply a very high speed of
convergence of about 24% per year.
However, as Arbia et al. (2008) point out, depending on the chosen econometric method, a
careful interpretation of the regression parameter has to be done. First, given the FEM setup
we have to keep in mind that the implicit speed is the adjustment process towards the region's
on steady state and not towards a common long-run level. Moreover, the rather unrealistically
higher convergence speed may stem from an estimation bias in the estimation of the lagged
variable as mentioned above. Indeed, for the FEMc model the speed of convergence reduces
signicantly to values between 5 and 6%. For the remaining variables the output of the FEM
and FEMc are nevertheless very similar. Both models also report negative coecients for the
funding variable in per capita terms as well as binary dummy specication. While the results
are signicant for the single lag specication, they are tested insignicant for the cumulated




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Also in the case of the SYS-GMM specication, most economic variables are estimated to
be statistically signicant for reasonable condence levels and in concordance with economic
theory. The objective 1 funding variable is negative and signicant for both, the single lag
specication as well as the augmented lag model. Since the SYS-GMM model relies on IV
regression, we put special attention to post-estimation testing of IV validity. Table 3 thus
reports the results of the Hansen J-statistic. Here, we deliberate chose a small number of IV
candidates based on a maximum lag length restriction of 4 periods as well as using collapsed
instruments in order not to weaken the testing results (see Roodman 2009; Bowsher 2002). As
the results show, we do not get any evidence for correlation between the selected instruments
and the model's error term. Based on a Di-in-Hansen test, isolating a subset of instruments,
we also explicitly check whether the use of the level equation in the SYS-GMM approach may
cause trouble and whether the internal instruments for the policy variable can be regarded as
exogenous. In both cases instrument exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
Taking this rst empirical evidence, we then move on to the case of the multiplicative
interaction model (case II). As already argued above, here it is nearly necessary to go beyond
the traditional regression output in order to convey quantities of interest such as the marginal
eect of an explanatory variable on the endogenous one. As we will show in the following, often
a graphical presentation of the eect together with reasonable condence intervals may help to
illustrate the intended point of interest, especially if the conditioning variables are continuous
as for our case of the objective 1 structural funds growth eect conditional on the underlying
initial income level or, alternatively, the region's gap to long-run steady-state level.
To identify the quantify of the additional growth impulse of the policy incentive multiplica-
tive interaction model from eq.(4), we take the dierence in the convergence rate between
funded and non-funded regions as  = (1 e netT)=T, solve for net and then use the obtained
coecient to measure the dierence in the speed of convergence conditional on the gap to
steady-state income as
nyi;t = n  (y

i;t   yi;t): (9)
nyi;t measures the marginal eect of objective 1 funding conditional on the region's gap at
time period t to the long-run steady-state level (in percentage points). Using this relationship
based on the regression results for the multiplicative interaction model according to eq.(4),
we can plot the distribution of the additional growth impulse of public support conditional
on the observed empirical variance of labor productivity. The resulting policy eects together
with a 95% condence interval are shown in Figure 3 for the FEMc and SYS-GMM using
funding intensities (left and center graph, respectively) as well as the SYS-GMM model using
the 0/1 ag indicator for being funded or not funded (right graph). The x-axis in Figure 3 plots
the income gap to the steady-state level, as in Pfaermayr (2009) we assume that all region
19approach their steady state from below and set the zero gap equal to the maximum value of
the income distribution in our sample.
The y-axis plots the marginal growth eect of the objective 1 structural funds in percentage
points. The displayed distribution of the marginal eects relative to the income gap in Figure
3 shows that the eect is negative for all three specications and is rather constant for dierent
income gaps. While the eect is insignicant for the dummy variable approach, it turns out sig-
nicant when using funding intensities. The estimated marginal eect is about 2{3 percentage
points smaller relative to the growth rate of non-funded regions for a similar projected income
position. The results thus support the negative ndings from the linear additive regression
model. Additionally, it shows that the lower growth performance of funded regions holds to be
almost constant for the plotted range dierences from steady state income. This indicates, that
no strong movements towards a common steady state take place and that dierent convergence
clubs are formed. The underlying regression results for the multiplicative interaction model
can be found in the appendix (see Table A1).
Figure 3: Marginal growth eect of objective 1 structural funds conditional on regional income gaps
Note: Left = FEMc estimates (XII), center = SYS-GMM (XIV), right = SYS-GMM with SF dummy (XV). Dashed
lines are 95% condence intervals according to Brambor et al. (2005).
204.3 Extension to modelling spatial dynamics: Case III and IV
One shortcoming of the above regressions is the disregard of spatial interdependence among
the variables. To account for the potential role of spatial spillovers originating from mutual
dependences among the variables, we now construct for each variables its spatial lag dened
as weighted average of values in the neighborhood of region i, where we use geographical
distances as weighting factors. The construction of a spatial weighting matrix W based on
geographical distances basically needs two modelling decisions to be taken: At the rst stage
one has to decide whether the geographical centriod or the region's capitol city is taken as
point of measurement. At the second stage the distances have to be transformed, in standard
procedures this is done by the inverted distance or the squared inverted distance. Alternatively
one can employ a k-nearest neighbor approach, which use geographical information to identify
neighbors in a rst step and then condense these information to a dummy variable if region j
belongs to the k-nearest neighbors of region i and 0 otherwise. A standard value is k = 10,
which allows a spatial eect to exist with the 10 next neighbors, but no inuence of the further
regions. Since the estimation results may crucially depend on the chosen underlying spatial
weighting scheme, use robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results to changes in the
weighting scheme. As default we use inverted distances to construct W. Data about capitol
cities come from Inforegio (2009), the distances between the capitol locations are calculated
with latitudes and longitudes by WGS84 system.
As rst check for the relevance of space in our regional dataset, we estimate the space-time
version of Moran's I statistic (STMI) for our outcome variable GDPpc as recently proposed
by Lopez et al. (2010). The resulting Figure 4 is easy to interpret: Using a scatter plot for a
standardized variable  y (with  y = [y  y]=sd(y)) against its average neighbors  ys the distribution
of observations in the four quadrants around the mean of  y and  ys captures a picture of the
spatial association of the variable y. If there is no spatial clustering the individual values of
ys should not systematically vary with y. On the contrary, for positive spatial association
observations above (below) the means of y should correlate with high (low) values for ys.
Fitting a regression line to this scatter plot its slope coecient shows the value for Moran's I
correlation given the original variable y and the weighting matrix W . The clearly upwards
sloping regression curve indicates a clear spatial connection of the regional GDPpc values. This
spatial correlation needs to be considered in the further estimations. Similar spatial correlations
are also detected for the set of regressors and for the residuals of the aspatial regression models.
Here the STMI results in the last row of Table 3 clearly hint at the need of estimating spatially
extended models to avoid a estimation bias stemming from cross-sectionally correlated residuals.
For cases III and IV we thus explicitly allow for spatial spillovers from the endogenous
variable and the set of regressors including our SF policy variable. We start with a specication
21Figure 4: Graphical presentation of Moran's I for per capita GDP
only containing spatial lags of the right hand side regressors and then also include a spatial
lag of the dependent variable in columns XVIII and XIX of Table 4. The latter inclusion
nevertheless has to be done carefully, in order not to aect the dynamic stability of the model
(see e.g. Parent & LeSage, 2009). We use a time-space dynamic specication, which restricts
spatial lags of the endogenous variable also to enter with a one period time lag (Bouayad-Agha
& Vedrine 2010). Since the SYS-GMM approach has shown satisfactory results in the aspatial
benchmark case and is easy to be applied to spatial circumstances, we concentrate on this
specication in the following. The regression results are reported in Table 4. The results show
that the time lagged endogenous variables remain statistically signicant and of almost equal
size as in the aspatial benchmark model. However, we do not nd signicant coecients for
the spatial lag of the dependent variable.
The spatial lags of the exogenous variables mostly turn out signicant. Here, the investment
intensity in neighboring region shows positive spillover eects on GDPpc in region i, while a
higher labour force participation rate in neighboring regions has the opposite eect. We can
also see from Table 4 that the negative total eect of objective 1 fundings mostly stems from its
spatial spillover part, while the direct eect is estimated to be insignicant. Again, we carefully
test for IV validity, since the number of instruments growth by the inclusion of spatial lags. As
shown, the Hansen J-statistic does not reject instrument exogeneity for reasonable condence
22intervals. There is no sign for remaining serial autocorrelation in the residuals as indicated by
the Arellano & Bond (1991) test (denoted AR2). Finally, we could reject the null hypothesis
that the spatial pattern in our policy variable is entirely attributable to a common spatial trend
(see De Castris & Pellegrini 2010 for details).
Table 4: Model estimates by Spatial SYS-GMM)
Dep. Var.: ln(GDPpct) XVI XVII XVIII XIX
SpSYS-GMM SpSYS-GMM SpSYS-GMM SpSYS-GMM
ln(GDPpct 1) 0.7816*** 0.7976*** 0.8930*** 0.8626***
(0.0716) (0.0538) (0.0679) (0.0585)
ln(INVt 1) -0.0091* -0.0020 -0.0113*** -0.0075***
(0.0051) (0.0017) (0.0033) (0.0028)
ln(HCt 1) 0.0372* 0.0332* 0.0090 0.0274*
(0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0119) (0.0155)
ln(LFSt 1) 0.0360* 0.0927* 0.0467* 0.0783
(0.0214) (0.0538) (0.0245) (0.0232)
ln(POPt) -0.0126 -0.2264 -0.7215 0.9924
(0.2909) (0.4532) (0.9126) (0.6504)
ln(SFt 1) 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0012) (0.0009)
ln(SFt 1) to ln(SFt 4) (joint) 0.0019 -0.0001
(0.0022) (0.0008)
(W  ln(GDPpct 1)) 0.3212 0.0306
(0.2363) (0.2479)
(W  ln(INVt 1)) 0.1018*** 0.0699*** 0.0962*** 0.0527***
(0.0301) (0.0115) (0.0185) (0.0155)
(W  ln(HCt 1)) 0.1702 0.1827 -0.3107** -0.1078
(0.2068) (0.1368) (0.1518) (0.1696)
(W  ln(LFSt 1)) -0.5931 -1.3381*** -1.7738*** -1.0545**
(0.6033) (0.4703) (0.4866) (0.4906)
(W  ln(POPt)) -3.3985 -2.1742 -0.8967 -4.5573
(2.1001) (3.9481) (3.0395) (5.2325)
(W  ln(SFt 1)) -0.0178** -0.0236***
(0.0071) (0.0074)
(W  ln(SFt 1)) to (W  ln(SFt 4)) -0.0411*** -0.0343***
(joint) (0.0157) (0.0787)
No. Of Groups 127 127 127 127
No. Of Obs. 1216 1052 1216 1052
Time Eects 121.98*** 241.08*** 179.02*** 153.50***
Hansen J-statistic 21.70* 28.17 24.21 25.59
AR2 0.89 0.33 0.57 0.52
Common factor test for W*SF (p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: ***, **, * = denote signicance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in brackets. SpSYS-GMM
as ecient two-step estimation. Common factor test according to De Castris & Pellegrini (2010). For details see text.
As a nal specication test, we compute the results of the spatially augmented multiplica-
tive interaction term model. This case IV may give further insights with respect to the role
played by spatial spillovers from other funded regions in the neighborhood of region i. Since
the graphical presentation involving two modifying variables (the initial income gap as in the
23aspatial specication as well as the amount of objective 1 funding for spatial neighbors) may
become confusing, for the latter variable we plot three scenarios. These are the marginal eect
of objective 1 funding to i on GDPpc in i conditional on its dierence to steady state income
i.) for a low level of funds received in the neighborhood (25% percentile), ii.) a medium level
(50% percentile) and iii.) a high level of funding in neighborhood regions (75% percentile).
The results are shown graphically in Figure 5.
The gure shows, that for regions dominated by a neighborhood with a high share of funding,
the resulting economic growth performance is signicantly worse o. For the medium scenario
(50% percentile) the eect is almost inexistent, while for those regions in the geographical
proximity of less intensively funded regions Figure 5 shows even a positive, albeit insignicant
eect. Since the estimated marginal eects are rather constant across dierent income gaps, we
additionally plot the mean eect for each percentile of the spatial lag of the policy variable. The
results in Figure 6 show that the eect is statistically signicant and negative for neighborhoods
characterized by a high share of objective 1 funding roughly above 75%. These latter results
conrm the theoretical expectations from the spatially augmented Solow growth models that
positive spillovers are the higher the more advanced the neighboring regions are and vice versa
(Pfaermayr 2009). In this sense, the share of objective 1 funding in the spatial neighborhood
can be interpreted as an indicator for technological backwardness. The result also supports
our interpretation from above that funded and non-funded regions form separate convergence
clubs, where lagging regions hold back each other. EU regional policy by means of objective 1
fundings seems to have no eect on fostering income convergence among EU15 regions.
24Figure 5: Marginal policy eect conditional on regional income gaps and spatial spillovers from funding
Note: Starred lines indicate signicance.
Figure 6: Signicance bounds for mean marginal eect of objective1 payments
Note: Upper and lower bounds for t-value are based on the 5% signicance level.
254.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we aim at testing the validity of the above results for alternative spatial weighting
matrices. As Stakhovych & Bijmolt (2009) have recently shown by means of Monte Carlo
simulations, the actual choice of W may indeed signicantly impact on the regression results.
Since the empirical literature does not oer clear guidance with respect to the design for W,
we use three dierent schemes as comparison for the reference case of inverted distances. The
rst alternative employs squared values of the original distance elements when constructing
inverted distance weights, and thus puts a much higher value on close neighbors.
As a second specication, we use a condensed binary k-nearest neighbor matrix with a
critical cut-o number of k = 10 as commonly used in other studies (see Ertur & Koch 2006
or Mohl & Hagen 2010). Matrix elements take a value of one if region j belongs to the 10
nearest neighbors of region i and is 0 otherwise. We standardize the matrix for the estimation
therefore the values are equal to 1=k instead of 1.8 As a third specication, we choose a
randomly generated matrix.9 We expect that spatial lags constructed from this matrix turn
out to be insignicant. Estimation results for the point estimates of our policy variable are
displayed in Table 5. The table shows that only for the randomly generated weighting matrix
the eects turn indeed out to be insignicant as expected apriori. For the other specication
the results are absolutely in line with our benchmark specication, underlying the validity of
the regression results from above.











XVI (W  ln(SFt 1)) -0.0178** -0.011*** -0.0096*** 0.00004
(0.0071) (0.0044) (0.003) (0.0408)
XVII (W  ln(SFt 1;t 2;t 3;t 4)) -0.0411*** -0.0165*** -0.0138*** 0.0067
(0.0157) (0.0061) (0.0044) (0.0407)
XVIII (W  ln(SFt 1)) -0.0236*** -0.0069** -0.0045** 0.0068
(0.0074) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0236)
XIX (W  ln(SFt 1;t 2;t 3;t 4)) -0.0343*** -0.0066 -0.0071 -0.0376
(0.0787) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0314)
Note: ***, **, * = denote signicance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in brackets.
8This matrix might be asymmetric; there is the possibility that region j belongs to the closest k neighbors of region i but not
the other way around. This problem concerns mainly peripheral regions of the EU15.
9This matrix is symmetric and has random number obtained from the Stata routine TRUERND written by Radyakin (2011).
265 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed the eectiveness of EU regional policy in fostering income con-
vergence among EU15 regions. The policy variable in focus are objective 1 (or \convergence")
payments. Since these funds have a clearly attributable policy goal and have a consistent legisla-
tive framework over the last three funding periods, a formal impact analysis can be conducted.
Using dierent empirical models derived from growth theory, we are able to estimate the eect
of objective 1 payments on regional GDP per capital evolution for 127 EU regions throughout
the sample period 1997{2007. We put particular attention to correctly specify and interpret
the policy variable in the regression approach as well as capture the role played by spatial
spillovers. This leads us to a total of for dierent empirical cases, which are estimated either
in a linear additive fashion or based on a multiplicative interaction model. All specications
employ modern methods for the analysis of dynamic panel data models.
Capturing the full range of potential transmission channels from the policy impact on our
outcome variable, the results ultimately all hint to the unpleasant conclusion that EU Objective
1 structural funds show to have no or even negative eects on regional growth in the EU15.
Our results also show that in particular the spatial components in the model play an important
role in the decomposition of this negative eect. We are able to conrm recent theoretical
contributions on the spatial Solow growth model indicating that negative spatial spillovers are
the higher the less advanced the neighboring regions are. In this sense, the share of objective
1 funding in the spatial neighborhood can be interpreted as an indicator for technological
backwardness. The results also hint at earlier ndings in the literature that funded and non-
funded regions form separate convergence clubs, where lagging regions hold back each other.
EU regional policy by means of objective 1 fundings seems to have no eect on fostering income
convergence among EU15 regions.
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